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Abstract
After the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, the French government 
reacted swiftly by declaring a state of emergency. This state of 
emergency remained in place for over two years before it was ended 
in November 2017, only after being replaced by the new anti-terror 
legislation. The attacks as well as the government’s reactions evoked 
parallels to 9/11 and its aftermath. This is a puzzling observation when 
taking into consideration that the Bush administration’s reactions 
have been criticized harshly and that the US ‘War on Terror’ (WoT) was 
initially considered a serious failure in France. We can assume that 
this adaption of the discourse and practices stems from a successful 
establishment of the WoT macro-securitization. By using Securitization 
Theory, we outline the development of this macro-securitization by 
comparing its current manifestation in France against the backdrop 
of its origins in the US after 9/11. We analysed securitizing moves in the 
discourses, as well as domestic and international emergency measure 
policies. We find extensive similarities with view of both; yet there are 
differing degrees of securitizing terrorism and the institutionalisation 
of the WoT in the two states. This suggests that the WoT narrative is 
still dominant internationally to frame the risk of terrorism as an 
existential threat, thus enabling repressive actions and the obstruction 
of a meaningful debate about the underlying problems causing 
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Introduction 
The beginning of 2015 was overshadowed by terror in 
France, as two Al-Qaeda linked gunmen killed twelve people 
in an attack on the French satire magazine “Charlie Hebdo” on 7 
January in Paris. The following day, another attacker murdered 
four people and held fifteen hostages in a Jewish supermarket. 
That same year in November, the French capital was struck 
again: 130 people were killed and 350 injured as a result of 
bombings and shootings taking place across Paris. The French 
government reacted swiftly by declaring a state of emergency, 
which was renewed five times before it was replaced by new 
anti-terror legislation in November 2017. The day after the 
terrorist acts, President Hollande announced that he considered 
the attacks not as crimes, but as acts of war (Hollande 2015a). 
The reactions evoked parallels to 11 September 2001 and its 
aftermath. The discourse of ‘a French 9/11’ (cf. Libération 2015) 
was picked up by the media, as well as by academic analysts 
such as Christian Lequesne, who claimed that “[s]imilar to 
the 9/11 events in the USA, the Paris terrorist attacks […] have 
changed the relationship between French society and security” 
(2016: 306). Especially the drastic restriction of civil liberties in 
the state of emergency is remindful of the “USA PARTIOT Act”. 
Moreover, the increased number of airstrikes in Syria invokes 
parallels to the US global ‘War on Terror’ (WoT), as does President 
Hollande’s rhetoric. This indicates the establishment of a shared 
understanding of (global) threat and how to deal with it, or in 
analytical terms, macro-securitization. 
Drawing on the assumption that “danger is not an objective 
condition” (Campbell 1992: 2), but rather an interpretation of risk 
allowing for certain actions to be taken; neither the reading of, 
nor the measures taken after a “terrorist” attack are universally 
predetermined. Thus, the reactions that we can observe in the 
US and France are the result of linking and interpreting the 
events as an essential threat to their own imagined community, 
i.e. the state. However, alternative interpretations and actions 
would have been possible. One such alternative would have 
been criminal prosecution, instead of taking the path of the 
so-called WoT. Buzan (2008: 560) comments on this alternative, 
stating that “[i]f the response to terrorism is constructed in 
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will have to adjust to terrorism by accepting a certain level of 
disruption and casualties as the price of freedom1. Moreover, 
the US and its allies’ reactions to 9/11 are widely regarded as a 
military failure. Thus, one should expect the French reactions 
to differ from those of the US regarding the attacks on 9/11 
particularly with the hindsight of over a decade. While these 
similarities seem puzzling at first, our hypothesis is that 
they are the result of the acceptance of the WoT as macro-
securitization: a global framework and “overarching conflict” 
(Buzan and Waever 2009: 253) which structures international 
as well as domestic security. Initially, France contested the 
establishment of the WoT as a macro-securitization, especially 
in the case of the Iraq War 2003. However, it has since started 
to link its own security issues to the WoT securitization. This 
encompasses the characterisation of terrorist attacks as ‘acts 
of war’ and the willingness to accept them as legitimisation 
for military action abroad. Moreover, political challenges, such 
as the integration of migrants from former colonies and their 
descents, are moved into the realm of security. In contrast to 
the US, France’s securitizing actors will have to address their 
countries security within the EU framework, potentially leading 
to a spill-over of security measures to other EU countries. To 
examine this hypothesis and explore the reactions in a focused 
and structured manner, we apply the Securitization Theory, 
analysing speech acts and emergency measures. This allows 
us to uncover linkages between state-level and macro-level 
securitization, thus shedding light on the interpretations and 
practices that follow from linking the attacks to the WoT. The 
article’s emphasis is placed on securitizing moves, identified 
by employing a discourse analysis, and emergency measures, 
analysed through the screening of new legal prescriptions 
(domestic level) as well as foreign policy decisions.
Methodology and structure of the article
Based on our theoretical framework, we conducted a 
discourse analysis (cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 176). The selection 
of texts as primary sources for our analysis follows Buzan et 
al.’s requirements, which state that “if a security discourse 
is operative in this community, it should be expected to 
materialize in this text because this occasion is sufficiently 
1 A concrete example of a government ‘resisting’ a politically tempting macro-
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important” (1998: 177). Texts were selected based on our heuristic 
judgment concerning the importance of each text for the public 
discourse. We define the US and the French government as the 
securitizing actors. Dealing with a presidential and a semi-
presidential system in our cases, we prioritized presidential 
statements by George W. Bush and Francois Hollande. 
Furthermore, in the US case, we focused on statements by Vice 
President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell and 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. Accordingly, in the case 
of France we included speeches by Prime Minister Manuel Valls, 
Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and Minister of Defence Jean-
Yves Le Drian. The period of analysis encompasses 14 November 
2015 to 15 July 2016. The cited passages represent only a sample 
of the analysed material, i.e. illustrations of arguments made 
in the texts. In light of the well-documented case of the Bush 
administration, we drew on the existing literature (cf. Jackson 
2005; Buzan 2006; Hodges 2011; Donnelly 2013; Oren and 
Solomon 2015; van Rythoven 2016), whereas in the French case 
we used mostly primary sources. 
The texts were read, scanned and coded for security moves. 
We looked at each case separately and, rather than creating 
categories a priori, we chose an inductive approach to avoid 
the reproduction of preformed ideas of how ‘securitization’ 
would unfold in the cases at hand. In doing so, we avoided co-
determining the results by using deductive categories or by 
applying the categories derived in one case to the other. Thus, 
we generated independent results for each case, which we 
compared afterwards. In the subsequent section, we provide 
an overview of our theoretical framework. We then move 
on to the empirical part of this paper, firstly addressing the 
case of the US, secondly the French one, which is followed by 
a discussion of our findings. We chose to compare the Paris 
attacks and the attacks on 9/11, as we see the later one as the 
hour of birth of the current macro-securitization of the WoT2. 
Therefore, we used it as a methodological anchor point against 
which to assess the adaptation of the macro-securitization in 
the recent case of France. 
2 During the last 17 years, the US WoT securitization itself has shifted, as the Obama 
administration promised a new approach to counterterrorism. However, research 
suggests that the WoT priorities and practices remained in place (or were even 
intensified, like targeted killings with drones) (cf. Cutler 2017) and so did the main 
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Securitization and macro-securitization 
Since the theory’s explicit composition in Buzan et al. 1998, the 
model has been continuously applied and further developed. 
The subject of terrorism, in particular the so-called WoT, (e.g. 
Buzan 2006; Roe 2008; Salter 2011, Aradau and van Munster 2009; 
Bright 2012) and the topic of migration (e,g. Bigo 2002; Huysmans 
2006) formed the empirical centre of the securitization debate. 
Apart from the concrete application of the theory, there are 
numerous works concerned with the theoretical framework 
and the theory’s development (e.g.: Williams 2011; Stritzel 2011; 
Roe 2008; Huysmans 2011; Albert and Buzan 2011; Wæver 1995, 
1999, 2011; Floyd 2016).
Buzan et al. define issues as politicised if they are part of regular 
public policy and debate and require actions by the government. 
Issues are defined as securitized if they are depicted and accepted 
as posing an existential threat requiring emergency measures 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Following the logic of existential threats 
and survival, every other problem loses its significance if this 
issue cannot be solved first and foremost (Buzan et al. 1998: 
24). The referent objects are the collectives that can be depicted 
as being existentially threatened (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). While 
states or nations are the most common, the theory allows for 
a variety of potential referent objects (Buzan et al 1998: 21). 
Securitizing actors are those entities who declare a referent 
object as existentially threatened:
A securitizing actor is s.o., or a group, who performs the 
securitizing speech act. Common players in this role are 
political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and 
pressure groups. (Buzan et al 1998: 21) 
The audience is the entity at whom the securitizing move is 
directed. While the role of audience acceptance for a successful 
securitization is a much-debated subject (cf. Balzacq 2011: 
8; Bright 2012; Floyd 2016), we assume that in order for a 
securitization to be successful, the audience has to at least 
partially accept the security measures, i.e. “it is accepted that 
some rules must be broken” (Bright 2012: 871). Roe (2008: 620) 
convincingly makes the case of a duality of the audience. In 
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governmental securitizing moves are, in many cases, also 
directed at national representatives of the parliament. If only 
one of the audiences can be convinced, this process of partial 
securitization is coined as “rhetorical securitization” (Roe 
2008: 633), full approval of the threat as well as the emergency 
measures poses an “active securitization” (Roe 2008:633). 
Having successfully securitized an issue, the securitizing actor 
can take extraordinary measures. Examples are the absence 
of democratic rules and procedures and the restriction of 
certain rights. Following Bright, we assume that securitization 
measures might also be channelled into the legislative process, 
hence altering “the very structure of the legal system in the 
country” (Bright 2012: 875). The laws and legal structures 
(such as the new anti-terror legislation and the Department 
of Homeland Security) emerging from this channelling is 
what we refer to as the institutionalisation of securitization. 
Even though they were introduced following the formal rules, 
their material content would not be imaginable without the 
‘exceptional threat’ (cf. Aradau and van Munster 2009: 698). 
Besides, these legal institutions also lead to everyday practices, 
such as policing certain individuals (Aradau and van Munster 
2009), which would formerly have been considered exceptional. 
The speech act constitutes the securitizing move. “‘[S]peech acts’ 
[…] do not ‘report on things,’ but rather ‘do things’” (Léonard and 
Kaunert 2011: 57). Thus, the “performative nature of language” 
(Huysmans 2011: 372) is the important characteristic of the act. 
It is the “specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action 
‘because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, 
and we will not exist to remedy our failure’)” (Buzan et al. 1998: 
26) that distinguishes regular political talk from securitizing 
moves. Balzacq (2011: 9) notes that the specific language used by 
securitizing actors is adjusted to the audience’s experience of 
the particular issue. One thing all speech acts have in common 
is “a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, 
and a possible way out” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). In order to assess 
the success of securitizing moves, the analysis needs to take 
into account both the audience(s) and the facilitating conditions. 
“Facilitating conditions are the conditions under which the 
speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires 
or is abused” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). After all, the centrality of 
the speech act for securitization “does not mean a study of the 
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features rank high among the ‘facilitating conditions’ of the 
security speech act” (1998: 32). 
Macro- vs. micro-securitization 
The idea of the so-called macro-securitization, presented by 
Buzan (2006; 2008; see also Buzan and Waever 2009), argues that 
there are securitizations on the international level, as opposed 
to the classic case of securitizations on the state level, that have 
an umbrella-like function. They can ‘structure’ international 
security (Buzan 2006: 1102) by enabling securitizing actors 
on lower levels to fit their securitizing moves into the larger 
picture painted by the overarching macro-securitization. 
Actors can “link their own local problems” (Buzan 2006: 1104) 
to the prevailing macro-securitization. The prime example, 
according to Buzan, is the Cold War, when several national and 
regional securitizations took place within the larger framework 
of the macro-securitizations of capitalism and communism.
As macro-securitizations work on the international and the 
state level, there are 
permanent tensions across the levels, and [the macro-
securitisations] are vulnerable to breakdowns not just by 
desecuritisation of the macro-threat (or referent object) 
[…], but also by the middle level securitisation becoming 
disaffected with, or pulling away from, subordination to the 
higher level one […] (Buzan and Waever 2009: 257). 
For instance, the WoT macro-securitization could be destabilised 
if other states came to perceive that the alleged joint fight 
against terrorism has more to do with particular US interests 
than with some global concern (Buzan and Waever 2009: 257). 
While macro-securitizations in general proceed like state-
level ones and should thus be studied “in terms of actors, 
audiences, speech acts and synergy with other actors and their 
securitisations […] (Buzan and Waever 2009: 257), they benefit 
from a certain vagueness. This allows them to function as an 
empty signifier. Hence, they can tie together various lower level 
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Their referent objects are broader in nature than those of 
lower-level securitizations, thus they are suitable for a variety 
of audiences. In our case, while in a micro-securitization 
the nation is a common referent object, in the WoT macro-
securitization civilisation itself is threatened. Accordingly, in 
this case, the security move might be directed at a regional or 
global audience, not just at a national one. 
We propose looking at the two empirical cases of 9/11 and the 
terrorist attacks in France as part of a continuum. Can we 
regard the French reactions as continuation of the WoT? Buzan 
claims:
The explicit ‘long war’ framing of the GWoT [Global War 
on Terror] is a securitizing move of potentially great 
significance. If it succeeds as a widely accepted, world-
organizing macro-securitization it could structure global 
security for some decades, in the process helping to legitimize 
US primacy. (Buzan 2006: 1102). 
While the latter assertion must be questioned (the WoT has 
probably hurt ‘US primacy’ more than it helped to sustain it), 
the argument that a global anti-terror-securitization has an 
all-encompassing quality is still valid. Under the ‘umbrella’ of 
the macro-securitization, numerous governments all over the 
world have defended ‘anti-terror’ measures by resorting to the 
logic and rhetoric that has been at work in the US since 9/11. 
Thus, it seems that the idea has indeed ‘succeeded’. 
One more argument stands out with view to the US and the 
French case, as will be shown in the analysis below: the WoT 
“is mainly about the state versus uncivil society” (Buzan 
2006: 1116). In a globalized world, the “traditional Hobbesian 
domestic security agenda gets pushed up to the international 
level” (Buzan 2006: 1116). Buzan claims that, due to the nature 
of the threat and of liberal society; every possible reaction to 
counter this threat necessarily constitutes a securitization. “In 
each case, the necessary action requires serious compromising 
of liberal values” (Buzan 2006: 1116.). Our analysis contributes 
to answering the question of whether the anti-terror-narrative 
“is pervasive and dynamic enough and whether the other 
necessary factors are in place to make the GWoT a durable 
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Securitization in the US after 9/11
The securitization that took place in the US in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 terror attacks (is widely accepted as a prime example 
of the Copenhagen School’s approach (cf. Buzan 2006; Donnelly 
2013; Oren and Solomon 2015; van Rythoven 2016). A range of 
emergency actions were enacted in the subsequent weeks and 
months after the attacks, which had been carried out by 19 
hijackers (among them 15 Saudi-Arabians) and cost the lives 
of 2,977 people. On the legislative level, the USA PATRIOT Act 
was adopted by an overwhelming majority in the US Congress. 
It was signed into law by President Bush on 26 October 2001, 
just three days after it had been introduced at the House of 
Representatives. This anti-terror legislative package included 
measures to restrict civil liberties, introduce additional 
surveillance, increase border controls, as well as measures for 
a widely increased authority for intelligence agencies. It also 
enabled the US to detain suspects of terrorism without due 
process at the US military’s Guantanamo Bay camp. The creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security, under which several 
domestic anti-terror authorities were bundled, is directly linked 
to the events of 9/11 and constitutes an important element of 
the Bush administration’s institutionalization of the WoT. The 
department still exists and, as of 2016, employs 240.000 people 
(Department of Homeland Security 2016).
In view of the securitizing moves there are four distinct types 
stand out. Firstly, the Bush administration categorized the 
terrorist attacks as acts of war. On 15 September 2001, President 
Bush, at Camp David, declared: 
I am going to describe to our leadership what I saw: the 
wreckage of New York City, the signs of the first battle of 
war. Make no mistake about it: underneath our tears is the 
strong determination of America to win this war. […] We’re 
at war. There has been an act of war declared upon America 
by terrorists, and we will respond accordingly. (Bush 2001a). 
On 9 October 2001, the President stated, “[t]he first shot of the 
new war of the 21st century was fired September the 11th. The 
first battle is being waged; but it’s only one of a long series of 
battles” (Bush 2001b). On another occasion, he noted that the 
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he mind-set of war must change. It is a different type of battle. 
It’s a different type of battlefield. It’s a different type of war” 
(Bush 2001c). Secretary of Defence, Donald H. Rumsfeld, picked 
up on this argument in an Op-Ed in the New York Times on 27 
September 2001, noting that “this will be a war like none other 
our nation has faced. […] Even the vocabulary of this war will be 
different” (Rumsfeld 2001). The domestic consequences of such 
a war were foreshadowed by Bush, when he declared:
This is a different war from any our nation has ever faced, 
a war on many fronts, against terrorists who operate in 
more than 60 different countries. And this is a war that 
must be fought not only overseas, but also here at home. 
[…] We’ve added a new era, and this new era requires new 
responsibilities, both for the government and for our people. 
(Bush 2001d)
This classification has far-reaching consequences. During 
times of war, everything is subordinate to the goal of prevailing 
over the enemy. In the domestic field, the rally-round-the-flag 
effect often closes the ranks between the opposition and the 
government in power. After the 9/11, Bush benefited enormously 
from this effect, as well as from the omnipresent call for 
presidential leadership (Rudolf 2005: 10). On an administrative 
level, the focus of anti-terrorism measures shifted from the 
predominantly civilian sphere to primarily military means.
The second strand of argument concerns the orientation towards 
worst-case scenarios. On 26 October 2001, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, in remarks to NGO leaders at a conference hosted at the 
State Department, described the danger resulting from global 
terrorism as a “threat to civilization” and as a “threat to the 
very essence of what you do” (Powell 2001). President Bush, in 
his special address to Congress on 20 September 2001, spoke of 
a “threat to our way of life” (Bush 2001e). On 8 November 2001, 
he declared in a speech that “[w]e are the target of enemies 
who boast they want to kill, kill all Americans, kill all Jews and 
kill all Christians” (Bush 2001d). The terrorists are, thus, not 
only fighting against America, but also against Judaism and 
Christianity. As Jackson points out, Colin Powell on several 
occasions called Osama Bin Laden “unfaithful” (Powell 2001, 
cited from Jackson 2005: 65) and even went as far as claiming 
that the terrorists “[…] believe in no faith. They have adherence 
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also highlights the parallel between this element of the WoT 
and the Cold War (Jackson 2005: 65.), in which the communists 
were depicted as godless atheists. Hence, well established 
elements from the old macro-securitization are reused to build 
the new one. 
Furthermore, Bush alleged that “[t]housands of dangerous 
killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported 
by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like 
ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning” (Bush 2002a). 
Vice President Cheney (2003), in referring to the ‘weapons’ used 
on 9/11, explained: 
The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the 
possibility that the next time terrorists strike, they may well 
be armed with more than just plane tickets and box cutters. 
The next time, they might direct chemical agents or diseases 
at our population or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon 
in one of our cities. These are not abstract matters to ponder. 
They are very real dangers that we must guard against and 
confront before it’s too late. (Cheney 2003) 
The uncertainty which was connected to the alleged threats and 
to what might happen if these menaces were not eliminated, 
contributed to the elevation of the threat perception. In the case 
of the WoT, some points stood out in that regard: one argument 
claims that terrorists would destroy liberty and the (Western) 
‘way of living’; another mentioned the fear of the use of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), which could have devastating 
consequences; and the third strand of argument, prevalent 
in the discourse of the Bush administration post-9/11, is the 
construction of a link between terrorism and so-called “rogue states”. 
Even asymmetric conflicts take place in the territories of states; 
whether the training of fighters or suicide killers in so-called 
terror camps, as was the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or 
the planning and execution of terror plots. Establishing a link 
between terrorist organizations and their ‘host’ countries, was 
one way to justify the missions conducted by the US in these 
countries. 
Already on 11 September 2001, Bush declared in his address to 
the nation, “[w]e will make no distinction between the terrorists 
who committed these acts and those who harbour them” (Bush 
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clear that the WoT would also be targeted at the governments 
of other states, a “war against all those who seek to export terror 
and a war against those governments that support or shelter 
them” (Bush 2001g). The argument culminated in the assertion 
of the Bush administration that certain countries formed the 
“axis of evil” by supporting terrorism and striving for WMD 
(Bush 2002a). This served as a major securitizing move in the 
securitization of Iraq as an existential threat and was crucial 
for justifying the Iraq War of 2003.
A fourth strand of argument constitutes the assertion of the 
necessity for ‘pre-emptive strikes’; menaces must be countered 
before they materialize because the gravity of the threat does 
not allow for a wait-and-see approach. Especially in conjunction 
with the argument on the potential use of WMD by terrorists or 
states forming the “axis of evil,” this strand of argument, which 
became known as the “Bush Doctrine”, served to further justify 
the invasion of Iraq. In a speech at the West Point military 
academy on 1 June 2002, Bush declared that:
[d]eterrence […] means nothing against shadowy terrorist 
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment 
is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of 
mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or 
secretly provide them to terrorist allies (Bush 2002b). 
In summary, the Bush administrations’ securitizing moves 
were characterised by the classification of the attacks as acts 
of war, the orientation towards worst case scenarios, a link 
between terrorism and so-called rouge states and the necessity 
for pre-emptive strikes. At the same time, terrorists were 
depicted as uncivilised, unfaithful barbarians. We now turn to 
the French case to analyse similarities and discontinuities of 
this case of securitizing terrorism. 
Securitization in France after the November 2015 terror attacks
In a series of terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 and 14 November 
2015, 130 people were killed, while 350 more were injured (FIDH 
2016). The nine perpetrators belonged to a terrorist cell in 
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In addition to some instant measures, directed at the immediate 
threat during the attacks (i.a. closing of the airport Paris-Orly, 
shut-down of parts of the Paris subway system), President 
Hollande declared the state of emergency by decree in the whole 
country (cf. Legifrance 2015). This happened for the first time 
in this all-encompassing form since the Algerian War over 50 
years ago, constituting a historic event. The state of emergency 
became active at midnight, merely two and a half hours after 
the first detonations at the football stadium Stade de France (cf. 
Reuters 2015). Historically, the French state of emergency was 
envisioned to have an option between the normal state and the 
state of siege. It needs to be upheld by parliament if it is in place 
for more than 12 days (cf. Le Monde 2015) and is intended in case 
of an ‘immediate threat resulting from severe attacks on the 
public order, which due to their nature and their severity, can 
be characterized as public imminence’3 (Loi n° 55-385 1955). The 
promulgation of the state of emergency granted the authorities 
extraordinary rights to restrict certain civil liberties.
Overall, the state of emergency was prolonged by the parliament 
five times, before it finally ended in November 2017 and 
was replaced by new anti-terrorism legislation. Facilitating 
conditions for the continuous prolongation were the terror 
attack in Nice on 14 July 2015 and the presidential elections in 
2016. The new bill transferred parts of the extended executive 
rights during the state of emergency into regular legislation. 
During the state of emergency, the government had advocated 
for a law that would have made it possible to take away French 
citizenship from “people with dual citizenship who have been 
convicted of terrorism-related crimes” (The New York Times 
2016). However, the attempt was strongly contested in the 
legislative process and ultimately abandoned. However, new 
laws that were adopted grant police and other law enforcement 
more competences including: the use of deadly force when 
encountering terror suspects; the possibility to put suspects 
under house arrest after their return from conflict areas in 
Syria and Iraq; and additional use of surveillance technology 
“that had been available only to intelligence agencies” (The 
New York Times 2016). A human rights report conducted by 
3 “L’état d’urgence peut être déclaré sur tout ou partie du territoire métropolitain, 
des départements d’outre-mer, des collectivités d’outre-mer régies par l’article 74 de 
la Constitution et en Nouvelle-Calédonie, soit en cas de péril imminent résultant 
d’atteintes graves à l’ordre public, soit en cas d’événements présentant, par leur nature 
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international experts on the practices of the state of emergency 
for the period between 14 November and 13 May 2016, found 
that the authorities heavily used their extended scope (cf. FIDH 
2016). Albeit, the effects were meagre; “some 3,600 warrantless 
searches and 400 house arrests have resulted in a mere six 
terrorism-related criminal investigations” (The New York Times 
2016). Only one of them resulted in a prosecution (cf. The New 
York Times 2016). Nevertheless, the new legislation adopted the 
possibility of preventive house searches and interrogations (cf. 
Rescan 2017).
Under the new law, authorities can declare certain places or 
events ‘security areas’, as well as frisk individuals and their 
belongings. House arrests based on executive demand are no 
longer legal, but suspects can be ordered to stay within their 
community. Finally, executive authorities can shut down 
religious institutions for up to six months if hate, violence 
or discrimination is encouraged in those places. The law is 
applicable until 2020, when parliament will decide anew about 
the expanded executive competences. (cf. Le Monde 2017). Critics 
of the new law see it as a ‘permanent state of emergency’4 (Le 
Monde 2017). 
Further emergency measures included the temporal 
reintroduction of border controls; in accordance with the 
Schengen agreement which grants the possibility to do so in 
emergency situations. In April 2018, the border controls were 
prolonged and are now to end in October 2018. Besides, on 
17 November 2015, France was the first EU member state to 
requested support by invoking the mutual assistance clause of 
the EU treaty which states that “[i]f a Member State is the victim 
of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all 
the means in their power […]” (Treaty on the European Union, 
Art. 42: 7). Thus, the terrorist attacks were defined as an armed 
aggression on its territory. Answering this call for EU solidarity 
does not have to come in form of direct military assistance. In 
this way, the EU treaty gives more leeway than NATO’s Article 
5. Rather than triggering an automated response, the affected 
country can request aid in bilateral negations. France was 
granted support from its European partners in other missions 
to free the resources, deemed necessary to fight the terrorist 
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threat. Germany, for instance, pledged to increase its military 
presence in Mali in order to disburden France. 
On the foreign policy level, France intensified its military 
commitment against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, escalating its 
air campaign to Syrian targets and striking the terrorist 
organization’s capital, Raqqa (cf. The Guardian 2015). In his 
speech to both houses of parliament on 16 November 2015, 
President Hollande announced that “France will step up its 
operations in Syria. […]” (Hollande 2015c). 
The range and scope of measures adopted and enacted since 
the Paris terror attacks constitute extraordinary measures in 
the understanding of the Securitization Theory. The condition 
of substance is thus met. It must be acknowledged that, apart 
from the very first declaration of the state of emergency, 
all emergency measures were duly approved by democratic 
means through the Assemblée nationale and the French Senate. 
However, the speed and unanimity in which new laws and the 
state of emergency were adopted indicates that securitization 
took place. For instance, the prolongation of the état d’urgence 
after the attack in Nice only took five days (cf. Reuters 2016). 
This clearly poses a case of “actions outside the normal bounds 
of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). The fact that the 
decision was taken with vast majority in both chambers of 
parliament suggests strong political will or even pressure to 
affirm the executive’s standpoint. Strong parallels between 
the French and the US case can be observed in regard to this 
point (see above, adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act). Yet, the 
fact that the government’s plans to change the constitution 
ultimately failed, due to resistance in parliament, shows that 
the government was not handed a carte blanche to do whatever 
it deemed appropriate. The interpretation of the parliament’s 
role in granting emergency measures is further complicated 
by the fact that the country’s major opposition party, Les 
Républicains, is generally regarded as more hawkish with view 
to national security than the socialists. For example, former 
President and contender for the presidential elections 2017 
Nicolas Sarkozy made headlines in 2016 by calling for even 
more drastic counter-terrorism measures, such as mandatory 
electronic tags for “anyone showing signs of being radicalized” 
(The Guardian 2016). The measures were not uncontested and 
subjected to international criticism in the media. The New 
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do nothing to help France fight terrorism — it already has 
sweeping counterterrorism laws — and may do permanent 
damage to the very things the Islamic State wishes to destroy: 
France’s democratic freedoms and its social cohesion” (The New 
York Times 2016). The newspaper was also concerned by the 
alleged misuse of police authority, as “[t]he state of emergency 
has been abusively used to put environmental and labor-law 
activists under house arrest” (The New York Times 2016.).
Nevertheless, the French public seems to have widely accepted 
the measures taken by the government. Two months after the 
first proclamation of the state of emergency, 77 percent of the 
French agreed that it was justified (cf. Clavel 2016). In a different 
study published in June 2016, only 14 percent were in favour 
of ending the state of emergency, while 48 percent supported 
tightening it (cf. Institut d’Études Opinion et Marketing en 
France et à l’International 2016: 9). The military commitment 
in Syria was supported by the French public even before the 
attacks in November 2015. In a poll published in September 
2015, 56 percent of the respondents were in favour of deploying 
ground troops (cf. L éxpress 2015). After the attacks, 62 percent 
of the respondents in a different poll approved the military 
intervention in Syria (cf. Le Parisien 2015). However, the form of 
the intervention (ground troops or airstrikes) was not specified 
and the respondents were most likely referring to the airstrikes 
that Hollande had announced. 
With view to Roe’s classification, the French case amounts to 
a full “active securitization” (2008: 633), which is supported by 
both the public as well as the legislative. Moreover, in the case of 
macro-securitization, one also has to consider the international 
audience. The fact that security acts, such as the reintroduction 
of border controls, were approved by the other members of the 
European Union indicates that the WoT framing was accepted, 
hence legitimatising the measures. In the subsequent section, 
we will illustrate how the dual audience’s acceptance has been 
obtained discursively.
Securitizing moves in the French discourse
The analysis of the French discourse, after the Paris attacks 
of November 2015, reveals a clear attempt by the French 
government to securitize the issue. All in all, the speech acts 
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The “way out” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33) is presented in detail by 
the various concrete emergency measures that are announced 
in the statements. A few strands of arguments stand out when 
we take a closer look at the securitizing moves performed by 
the French securitizing actors. The first one is the striking 
presentation of the terrorist attacks as acts of war (see also 
Bogain 2017). President Hollande went on national TV the first 
time while the attacks were still on-going. When he informed 
the public about the state of emergency, on this occasion, he 
spoke of the terrorists as “criminals” (Hollande 2015b). 
In a statement issued just one day after the attacks, President 
Hollande introduced the WoT rhetoric: 
 ...what happened yesterday in Paris at Stain-Denis near 
the Stade de France is an act of war and faced with war, the 
country has to take the appropriate action. It’s an act of 
war committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, a jihadist army, 
against France, against the values that we defend in the 
entire world, against who we are, a free country that speaks 
to the whole world. It’s an act of war that was prepared, 
organised, planned from the exterior, with internal collusion. 
(Hollande 2015a).  
In his speech before both houses of parliament two days later, 
Hollande (2015b) repeated this claim, which Prime Minister 
Valls also supported in a TV interview the day after the attacks 
(cf. Valls 2015a).
Faced with these “acts of war,” President Hollande (2015c) as 
well as Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (2015) called for unity 
and calm (“sang-froid”). Like Bush in 2001, Hollande draws the 
conclusion that France is facing a new type of war and enemy 
and calls for new ways of dealing with this “emergency”: 
But this is a different kind of war; we are facing a new kind 
of adversary. A constitutional scheme is needed to deal with 
this emergency. (Hollande 2015c) 
However, it remains unclear how this “war” is different from 
the one that – purportedly – started fourteen years ago, with 
11 September 2001. Even though France had not been struck by 
terror on such a large scale before, the phenomenon of Islamic 
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different forms of Islamic terrorism from the 1980s onward 
(cf. Rieker 2017: 134). It is, therefore, remarkable that the French 
president chose to describe it in such a way. 
The second strand of argument is related to the depiction of 
the securitizing subject, the entity that (allegedly) poses an 
existential threat to the referent object. Unlike in the WoT 
discourse surrounding the Bush administration’, in which the 
enemy remained diffuse, the French administration explicitly 
and repeatedly names ISIS as the enemy that needs to be fought 
and eliminated (cf. Hollande 2015c; Valls 2015b). On the one 
hand, the state-like qualities of ISIS are stressed when speaking 
about a “jihadist army” (Hollande 2015c). The terrorist threat is 
linked to certain regions such as Iraq and Syria, which Hollande 
calls “the largest breeding ground for terrorists that the world 
has ever known” (Hollande 2015c; see also Valls 2015b), but also 
to the Sahel and Central Africa (cf. Le Drian 2016). Yet, the states 
themselves are not described as ‘rogue states’, but as victims of 
terrorism themselves. Thus, terrorism can be interpreted as the 
enemy of statehood itself. Therefore, according to Hollande, the 
interventions in Mali and Iraq became necessary to fight the 
terrorists’ destruction of state sovereignty (cf. Hollande 2015c). 
On the other hand, analogous to the US discourse following 
9/11, the enemy is described as essentially barbaric and 
uncivilised, thus fundamentally different from the Self. This 
essentialisation is represented in Hollande’s statement that “[i]
t cannot be said that we are engaged in a war of civilizations, 
for these assassins do not represent one” (Hollande 2015c). The 
terrorists are contemptuously depicted as “coward murderers” 
and “barbarians” (Hollande 2015c). 
While Hollande portrayed France as existentially threatened, 
he added a global dimension by declaring: “[w]e are in a war 
against jihadist terrorism that threatens the entire world, 
not just France (Hollande 2015c.; see also Fabius 2015). The 
reactions to the attacks, such as the illumination of many 
European landmarks in the colour of the French flag as well 
as the statements of world leader, highlighted the (perceived) 
international dimension of the attacks. US President Obama 
strengthened this perception on an international level by 
stating: 
This is an attack not just on Paris, it’s an attack not just on 
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and the universal values that we share. (Obama 2015)
This notion was repeated by President Hollande three days later, 
with a stronger emphasis on France’s exceptionalism: 
And the ‘Tricolor’ of the French flag has adorned the most 
famous landmarks, reminding us that France has always 
been a beacon of humankind. And that when it is attacked, 
the whole world is thrown for a while into a shadow. 
(Hollande 2015c) 
France has been attacked because it embodies certain values, 
“[w]hat we are defending is our homeland, but it’s much more 
than that. It’s the values of humanity” (Hollande 2015a); France 
and its whole way of life, its l’art de vivre, its love of culture, sport 
and celebrations, its diversity, are at stake: 
On Friday, the terrorists’ target was France as a whole. 
France, which values life, culture, sports, celebrations. France, 
which makes no distinction as to color, origin, background, 
religion. The France that the assassins wanted to kill was 
that of its young people in all their diversity. […] What the 
terrorists were attacking was the France that is open to the 
world. Among the victims were several dozen of our foreign 
friends, representing 19 different nationalities. (Hollande 
2015c)
Prime Minister Manuel Valls used the same rhetorical patterns 
when he addressed the French Senat on 20 November 2015 
and the parliament on 25 November 2015. His statement also 
repeated other strands of arguments described above, as he 
called the conflict a ‘war’ the terrorists ‘barbarians’ (Valls 2015c).
The rhetoric and argumentation used by the French actors fits 
perfectly into the macro-securitization of the WoT: No country 
is alone in the war against jihadist terrorism. Moreover, “the 
GWoT tries to embrace in its self-understanding 99.9 per cent of 
the global population: all civilised or wanting-to-be-civilised 
people (all but the terrorists themselves)” (Buzan and Wæver 
2009: 264-265). The young, open-minded and sophisticated 
France described by Hollande and Valls is the complete opposite 
of the uncivilised barbarism which is ascribed to the terrorists. 
The assassins are linked to ISIS, which itself is described as 
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external threat. Nevertheless, Hollande concedes that at least 
some of the perpetrators were French nationals: “It hurts to say 
it, but we know that these were French people who killed other 
French people on Friday” (Hollande 2015c). However, the French 
President did not use this remark as a starting point to dwell on 
political or social reasons (such as the failed integration policy 
in France) or structures that might lead to the radicalisation of 
young French citizens, instead depicting them as isolated cases 
of criminal minds who do not really belong to France. “Living 
here in our land are individuals who start out by committing 
crimes, become radicalized, and go on to become terrorists” 
(Hollande 2015c). Consequently, Hollande called for the 
possibility to strip terrorists of their French nationality, even 
if they were born in France. While the description of the enemy 
as a well-organised army on the one hand and uncivilised on 
the other seems contradictory, in the context of securitization 
it permits the construction of a highly dangerous foe which 
needs to be eliminated at all costs (cf. Jackson 2005: 67). The 
construction of ISIS as a “foreign other” paves the way for 
counterterror measures on foreign territory with military 
means. The ascribed high degree of organisation multiplies the 
threat, and the term “army” perfectly fits into the narrative of 
the WoT; the depiction of the enemy as “barbaric” and devoid of 
any culture is necessary to fundamentally separate the enemy 
from the referent object that represents liberal values. In this 
context, the proclaimed necessity for total destruction of the foe 
(and far-reaching emergency measures) in order to ensure the 
survival of the referent object becomes clear. In his address 
to both chambers of the French parliament on 16 November 
2015, Hollande made use of this kind of argument in a very 
pronounced manner. Several times during his speech, he spoke 
of the necessity “to destroy ISIS” (Hollande 2015c). Renouncing 
the possibility to contain ISIS, he declared “[t]here is no question 
of containing it. This organization must be destroyed” (Hollande 
2015c). This resembles Bush’s argument that containment 
is not an option in the WoT. In the following section, we will 
summarise our findings and discuss the similarities and 
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Discussion 
Overall, we note that there is indeed a list of measures taken 
by France that can be subsumed under the Copenhagen School’s 
theoretical term of ‘emergency or extraordinary measures’. 
With regard to the French discourse after the November 2015 
attacks in Paris, there are various speech acts that constitute 
securitizing moves. Thus, like the Bush administration, the 
French government defined the situation as a ‘war ’ and points 
to the conflict as posing a new, unprecedented kind of war. 
This result indicates that the element of ‘war’ is adopted from 
the macro-securitization. However, even though the total 
destruction of the enemy is announced in both cases, there is 
little orientation toward ‘worst-case scenarios’ in the French 
case. While the enemy is still portrayed as foreign, with a 
clear geographical centre in the war zones of Syria and Iraq, 
the foes of the Bush administration are more diffuse, but 
also more broad, encompassing ‘terrorists’ as well as ‘rogue 
states’ in different world regions. While both governments 
proclaim to ‘destroy’ the enemies and thus eliminate all danger 
emanating from them, the Bush administration’s securitizing 
moves go further by extremely dramatizing the situation, 
mostly by way of using worst-case scenarios that function 
to elevate the perceived level of threat. Correspondingly, the 
enacted emergency measures that are justified through each 
securitization differ in a substantial way: while Bush conducts a 
foreign policy of ‘regime change’ (the Iraq War 2003), the French 
military actions enacted in the process of the securitization in 
France amount to little more than symbolic bombings in Syria 
and Iraq. Moreover, the strengthening of the executive power 
at the expense of the legislative is much more profound in the 
US than in France. While the (institutionally much stronger) US 
Congress relinquished its power early on with the “use of force 
resolution” in 2002 and handed the Bush administration a carte 
blanche to break international law by starting the Iraq war, the 
French Assemblée nationale (which is usually weaker) held its 
own by opposing the constitutional changes that might have 
damaged international law.
Regarding the institutionalisation of securitizations, the 
repeatedly extended state of emergency and the new anti-
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institutionalisation, however, is not as far reaching as in the 
US, where securitization became permanent by way of creating 
the Department of Homeland Security. France’s new law, in 
contrast, has a built-in ‘expiration date’, thus showing more 
reluctance to completely institutionalise its state of emergency. 
On a macro-level, it shows that, against all odds, politicians in 
2015, 14 years after 9/11, still proclaim to ‘destroy’ their terrorist 
enemies once and for all. Overall, the temptation of using the 
WoT narrative in order to stabilize the own identity and to justify 
violence against the out-group is strong (cf. Podvornaia 2013:78). 
Reacting in this way to Islamist terrorism is not limited to a 
particular country or bound to a particular national culture, 
but rather widespread. The narrative draws on well-established 
conceptions of the other, thus making the logic of the narrative 
easily accessible for a broad audience. By witnessing the events 
of 9/11 and the reactions in its aftermath, audiences seem to 
have been primed and new instances of terrorism can initiate 
a cascade all too familiar from past occasions; successful 
securitizing moves and emergency measures in the area of 
domestic politics as well as with view to security and foreign 
policies. The institutionalisation of the WoT and the embedment 
of national and/or regional securitizations of different forms 
of terrorism that can be observed today fit quite well into the 
macro-securitization framework that has been outlined above. 
However, comparing the two cases also shows shifts in the 
macro-securitization itself. While the ‘original’ war on terror 
was also coined in religious terms and emphasized violent 
foreign policy actions, the French securitization did not 
include a dominant depiction of terrorists as unfaithful, nor 
was the foreign policy response as strong as in the US case. 
The debate focused less on pre-emptive strikes and more 
on dealing with the alien terrorist within and, hence, the 
surveillance inside the country. This shows the adaption, as 
well as, the re-interpretation and re-construction of the macro-
framework in the specific French circumstances. While one 
can observe these adaptations to the domestic context on the 
one hand, on the other hand, the findings indicate that given 
the facilitating conditions of the attacks in the own country, 
it was easy to link them to the macro-framework of the WoT. 
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Conclusion 
What follows from these findings? First of all, it shows the 
dangers of securitizing terrorism on the domestic level. The 
use of the narrative allows denying certain individuals to be 
“real French citizens” and, in the end, of being fully human (cf. 
Podvornaia 2013: 89). The self-other relations are reinforced and 
due to the ongoing state of emergency, racist practices resulting 
from this discourse are facilitated. Thus, a meaningful debate 
about underlying problems leading to terrorist actions (as well 
as about structural violence that might precede the terrorist 
one) is made impossible. The French case adds to the dangerous 
precedents of blurring the sensitive line between ‘emergency 
measures’ and ‘normal politics’. 
On a theoretical level, it shows that the macro-securitization 
framework disposes over certain flexibility, as it allows linking 
other securitizations, such as migration and open boarders in 
the French case, to the macro-level. Further research on macro-
securitization should focus on which domestic securitizations 
are linked to the macro-framework of the WoT, and how. 
Similarly, investigation into the translation of the macro- to the 
micro-level framework would be fruitful. One aspect that could 
be especially productive in this context is; how dependent on 
historical domestic securitizations and concepts of terrorism 
is the successful implementation of the WoT? In other words, 
could the fact the terrorism in France has been seen as a 
threat stemming from Northern Africa, since the Algerian War, 
act as a facilitating condition in the adaption of the macro-
securitization of the WoT? Furthermore, are countries that 
have established different narratives about what terrorism is 
(like German with the Red Army Fraction or Spain with ETA), 
more resilient to this framing? We think that investigating 
and comparing the European reactions to attacks in these 
ways might produce benefits on two levels. On the empirical 
level, it will add to our insight of the different securitization 
and hence reactions of European states to ‘terrorist’ attacks. 
On the theoretical level, it allows for further integrating more 
recent theoretical approaches, such as Stritzel (2011), with the 
Copenhagen School, contributing to our understanding of 
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